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Doctoral Thesis Summary 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Over recent decades the European electricity sector has undergone a series of 
significant regulatory reforms. The liberalisation process has been driven by 
European directives toward the achievement of a competitive energy market together 
with security and environmental protection. While this market opening process has 
shown some positive results, and while significant lessons have been learned from 
the regulatory measures implemented so far, there are still important steps needed to 
complete the process and achieve effectively-competitive electricity markets. Thus, if 
electricity markets in the past have not naturally shaped themselves, a dynamic 
regulatory process is needed in order to achieve the established European goals.  
The European Commission has clearly stated the insufficient development of the 
Internal Market for both electricity and gas, also in consideration of the three main 
pillars of the European energy policy: competitiveness, security and environmental 
sustainability (EC, 2006).  
While the last EU energy sector enquiry has indicated that an efficient and 
competitive European electricity market is still far from being achieved, there are 
other concerns around the other two pillars of the European electricity policy. 
Regarding the issue of energy security, the recent blackouts across Europe, the 
persistent congestion both at national and cross border level, regulatory 
imperfections as well as lack of transmission unbundling from other segments of the 
industry have raised the issue that investments are not adequate to meet the pattern of 
constant demand increase. Moreover, also EU targets on the environmental pillar did 
not achieve the hoped for results. The European Commission has indicated that only 
nine Member States1 have achieved or will achieve the target in the time indicated, 
and that the majority are far behind (EC, 2007b). 
This thesis addresses several aspects of the ongoing and much debated issues within 
European electricity policy, relating to a more competitive, secure and green 
industry. The analysis in this work differs from the focus in most of the literature. 
This study is undertaken from the point of view of the transmission grid 
infrastructure, and investigates whether this segment could play a proactive role in 
the achievement of the three aspects of European electricity policy referred to above. 
While in the past the transmission grid has been rather overlooked, it is now seen as 
central to the electricity industry debate. As we will see, the different goals of EU 
                                                 
1 These Member States are: Denmark, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxemburg, Spain, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. 
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electricity policy cannot be fully achieved without appropriate attention to the grid 
infrastructure. 
This thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter analyses the current competitive 
and regulatory frameworks within the European electricity sector and the results 
achieved by the liberalisation process, mainly in the generation segment. While this 
work clearly underlines that EU integration is insufficient, the role of the grid 
infrastructure is analysed in order to foster competition and avoid strategic behaviour 
by incumbents. 
The second chapter underlines the importance of grid infrastructure investment 
within the European electricity sector in order to maintain and develop a secure 
electricity system and achievement of a “robust” transmission grid. In particular, the 
ownership arrangements of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) across Europe as 
well as the investments patterns of a sample of operators are studied in order to 
understand the effect of strategic behaviours coupled with regulatory imperfections. 
The role of regulation as well as more coordination of TSOs and other authorities are 
investigated as a possible answer to the creation of a “robust” transmission grid 
which avoids risks such as blackout and anticompetitive behaviour, which is 
exacerbated by information asymmetries.   
The third chapter investigates the development across Europe of renewable energy 
sources for electricity (RES-E) in connection with grid transmission barriers, with 
particular reference to wind power deployment. The development of RES-E, and the 
establishment of a European regulatory framework are analysed following an 
examination of the impediments to RES development and particularly those deriving 
from grid transmission barriers. The discretionary power of TSOs leading to 
anticompetitive risks, and the nature of new players in the renewable business is 
underlined. A case study of wind power deployment is carried out, which confirms 
the general impediments to further RES development and indicates how the cost 
approach to grid transmission connection could play an essential role in the 
achievement of the “green pillar” of European energy policy.  
In sum, while the three main pillars of European energy policy may lead to some 
contradictory and perhaps not very satisfactory results, this thesis aims is to underline 
the importance of the transmission grid in the further development of these goals. 
The work investigates whether the transmission grid can play a proactive role in the 
achievement of these goals, noting that TSOs control only one key segment of the 
electricity value chain. The various issues within European electricity policy can be 
mitigated if not solved by greater attention to the transmission grid infrastructure 
across Europe. This work shows that an efficient grid infrastructure is essential for 
the development of the Internal Market for electricity, increasing both national and 
cross-border interconnections in order to reduce the scope for market power abuse 
and to boost competition. In addition, a well connected internal and cross country 
industry would enhance the reliability of the system at both national and international 
levels. And finally, a robust transmission grid would allow the deployment of 
distributed generation, such as green electricity productions, hence favouring green 
electricity penetration. However, further regulatory steps will need to be undertaken. 
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2. Liberalisation of the European Electricity Industry: Interconnecting 
incumbents?* 
Over recent years a number of changes have occurred in the European electricity 
sector and the complexity of the industry has led to difficulties in implementing the 
liberalization process.  
The theoretical framework of the European electricity policy seems well designed, 
but its implementation is posing numerous problems. There are several elements to it 
that are hampering the achievement of an Internal Market in the electricity sector. 
Although a second package of electricity directives attempted to correct the 
limitations in the previous legislative framework, several problems still exist. The 
new EC proposal should guarantee a higher level of unbundling as well as more 
coordination between transmission system operators and regulators across Europe 
also with the supervision of a European agency. While it is not clear when and if this 
package will be implemented by Member states, one can argue since now that the 
provision of ISO arrangements (as second best option) presents several limitations. 
The second chapter will analyze in detail this issue. 
Added to these problems, are the reactions of incumbents to the new environment 
created by the liberalization process, and their strategies to increase concentration. 
Even though on the one hand these concentrations are driven by reasons of 
efficiency, on the other hand they strengthen the market power of incumbents as well 
as the risk of future collusion, raising other anticompetitive issues. 
Lack of effective privatisation in some Member States, ineffective unbundling, the 
absence of regulatory authorities that are independent of national governments and 
the two-thirds rule allow the formation of non-market based “national champions”.  
Table 1 presents the generation capacity of the major companies compared with 
demand in 2005, in some of the EU15 Member State. These data and the 
concentration ratios of main players in the market, helps to explain the high level of 
concentration in national industries. The particular characteristics of this sector 
coupled with the recent trend of M&A have hence enhanced the risk of abuse of 
market power and future collusion. 
 
Table 1: National Concentration Ratio of Major Electricity Utilities (2005) 
 
Member State  Demand (TWh) Companies 
National 
production 
company 
(TWh) 
Concentration Ratio 
Endesa 98 c1 38% 
Iberdrola 66 c2 63% 
Union Fenosa 26 c3 73% 
Spain 260 
Hidrocantabrica 15 c4 79% 
Portugal 51 Electricidade de Portugal 25 c1 49% 
                                                 
* A previous version of this chapter has been presented during the XX World Energy summit 
(November 2007)  as well as published in the Energy Policy Journal (2007), volume 35, Issue 10, The 
European Electricity industry: Concentration of the internal Market. 
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Member State  Demand (TWh) Companies 
National 
production 
company 
(TWh) 
Concentration Ratio 
France 477 EDF 429 c1 90% 
Belgium 88 Electrabel 76 c1 86% 
E.On 150 c1 27% 
RWE 140 c2 52% 
Vattenfall Europe 83 c3 67% 
Germany 554 
EnBW 55 c4 77% 
British Energy 73 c1 19% 
E.On UK 35 c2 28% 
RWE 33 c3 36% 
UK 390 
EDF Energy 25 c4 43% 
Austria 62 Verbund 30 c1 48% 
Vattenfall 88 c1 23% 
Fortum  54 c2 37% 
Statkraft 34 c3 46% 
Scandinavia 379 
E.On Nordic 33 c4 55% 
Enel 126 c1 39% 
Edison  48 c2 54% 
Edipower 25 c3 62% 
Italy  322 
Endesa Italia 21 c4 68% 
Source: own elaboration on data from Matthes et al.’s (2005), Vattenfall, annual 
report 2005, website companies. 
 
Moreover, the trend towards convergent mergers between gas suppliers and 
electricity generators needs to be taken into consideration. The main incumbents 
indeed compete in different geographic and product markets at the same time. As 
shown in Table 2 all major European players in the electricity sectors are active in 
both electricity and gas sector in different geographical markets. Moreover, they are 
active in different segments such as generation, distribution and/or retail in both 
sectors. The multimarket contact theory explains us how this situation can facilitate 
collusion within the electricity market2. 
Hence, in absence of interconnection, the abuse of market power by incumbents is a 
very present threat and several characteristics of this sector can induce future risks of 
collusion. The achievement of an Internal Market will solve most of the problems in 
                                                 
2 When firms compete in more than one market, the possibility of successful collusion is easier 
compared to the case where firms meet only in one market. Firms will collude only if the gains from 
collusion will be higher than the loss in case of price war. As the number of markets increases, the 
cost of price war becomes higher relative to the short run gains from cheating2. Vertical (and 
horizontal) concentration is hence able to make difficult the entrance of new actors and it reduces the 
number of competitors, making easier collusion among integrated firms (Green, 2006). Several 
authors have criticised this view, because if a firm is present in many markets, it can deviate in all of 
them at the same time. In other words, this situation has a double effect: on the one hand, it enhances 
the long-term cost of punishment but on the other, it also increases the short-term gains of cheating. 
However, there are different plausible circumstances where this theory can facilitate cooperation 
among firms (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). 
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the electricity sector. It will enhance competition, reducing the risk of market abuse 
and future collusion. Investments in interconnection are key to limiting most of the 
present and future risks for competition. Moreover, they will guarantee that future 
M&A will be for economic efficiency reasons and not to exploit market power. A 
better implementation of the Internal Market will ensure an open and competitive 
industry with the best prices for final consumers. However, this is a long way from 
being realized. 
Today, despite EU liberalisation policy, lack of EU directive implementation as well 
as increasing horizontal and vertical concentration are threatening the creation of the 
Internal Market for electricity. In absence of interconnection, the abuse of market 
power by incumbents is a very present threat and several characteristics of this sector 
can induce future risks of collusion.  
 
Table 2: Electricity and Gas Activities of Main Utilities Across Europe 
 
Electricity 
utilities (including 
subsidiaries) 
GE UK FR IT HU NL PT AT BE ES PL SK 
E ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪     ▪ ▪   ▪ ▪ 
EDF 
G ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲                 
E ▪ ▪   ▪ ▪ ▪   ▪   ▪   ▪ 
E.ON 
G ▲   ▲ ▲               ▲ 
E       ▪           ▪   ▪ 
ENEL 
G     ▲ ▲           ▲   ▲ 
E ▪   ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪   ▪ ▪ ▪   
Electrabel 
G ▲     ▲   ▲     ▲       
E ▪ ▪     ▪     ▪ ▪   ▪ ▪ 
RWE 
G ▲ ▲     ▲ ▲   ▲ ▲       
E ▪   ▪ ▪     ▪   ▪ ▪     
Endesa 
G             ▲     ▲     
E   ▪               ▪     
Iberdrola 
G   ▲               ▲     
E   ▪             ▪ ▪     
Centrica 
G   ▲             ▲       
E ▪                   ▪   
Vattenfall 
G                         
Source: own elaboration based on companies annual report (2005) 
 
A new European policy is needed to create incentives to invest, particularly in 
interconnection infrastructures to connect the different regional and national 
wholesale markets.The existing interconnection infrastructures in fact do not 
guarantee limitation of the possible anticompetitive effects deriving from 
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concentration in national markets (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). The chapter shows that 
an efficient grid infrastructure is essential for the development of the Internal Market 
for electricity, increasing both national and cross-border interconnections in order to 
reduce the scope for market power abuse and to boost competition. 
The chapter is structured as follows. After a description of the implications of the 
industry's characteristics for the liberalization process, an analysis of the European 
regulatory framework and its achievements is presented. The trend towards 
horizontal and vertical integration of generators and their possible anticompetitive 
effects are hence studied. Following a discussion of European policy towards 
concentration, and in consideration of transmission, a better implementation of 
interconnection within the Internal Market is proposed as one of the main solutions 
to present and future risks in the conditions of competition in Europe. Lessons are 
drawn from other regional and international experiences. The final section offers 
some conclusions. 
 
3. Development of the European electricity transmission grid: economic 
investments for reliability? 
Since liberalisation, the regulatory framework has mainly focused on competitive 
issues. However, consideration has also been given to the effects that the opening up 
and unbundling would have on other important features, such as the transmission 
grid. In Chapter 1 we analysed the implications for the generation segment of a better 
interconnected industry, in this chapter we analyse in detail another related issue, 
European policy concerning the network infrastructure, with specific attention to 
reliability and economic investments in the grid. 
Most of the literature has underlined the positive and negative aspects of this process, 
but less attention has been given to the role of the infrastructure, partly because of 
the high uncertainty characterising this segment. What will be the effects on 
investments and reliability in the future is an open question. The issue is discussed 
within this chapter. 
European policy aimed at a fully liberalised Internal Market has indeed led to 
regulatory spillovers in the transmission segment of the industry, where features such 
as unbundling have been introduced. At the same time, policy making in relation to 
transmission investments have changed. There is currently important debate over the 
development of the Internal Market and the role of investments in the transmission 
segment. However, elements such as congestion, price differences across Europe, 
and blackout risks are introducing other issues into the debate, such as the benefits of 
a reliable system versus the achievement of European electricity policy goals. 
In the past, progressive policy development toward liberalisation has not taken 
account of its effects on the European transmission grid and its capacity to ensure 
reliability. Actions are needed to provide incentives for the building of more 
transmission capacity and to ensure coordination between TSOs and regulators 
across Europe. In particular way, economic investments should be boosted more 
efficiently to reduce congestion with the ultimate aim of lowering prices and 
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improving the reliability of the system. A number of different actions are needed to 
align the interests of private investors with the interests of the community.  
In terms of network infrastructure investment, Figure 1 shows an overview of the 
transmission investment patterns for a sample of transmission network operators 
within Europe. While this figure does not provide a complete picture for Europe, it 
can be taken as a good indicator of European investment paths. These companies 
operating in the different countries represent significant areas of territory and 
population numbers across Europe. Although data for the Scottish and Southerm 
TSO are not available before 2003, some general conclusions can be drawn. It seems 
that transmission investments do not follow a constant pattern. This can generate 
important congestion problems within control zones and national networks. The data 
confirm that in the past national regulators have not paid sufficient attention to 
transmission issues, but, like TSOs, seem to have become more aware of them 
following the recent blackouts. However, this does not mean that they are sufficient 
to meet all present and future infrastructural needs in a constant path of increasing 
demand. 
There is no guarantee that the present levels of investment will be sufficient to cover 
future electricity needs. Intuitively, the investment path should to some extent 
depend also on national consumption patterns. It is therefore useful to compare 
investments and consumption paths. This comparison enables some conclusions 
about the nature of investment and the possibility that markets can establish 
appropriate incentives for new investments in transmission networks. 
 
Figure 1: Investment Path Major EU Electricity TSOs (2000-2006) 
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Figure 2 shows this contraposition between company investments and national 
electricity consumptions. While the figures do not provide information about the 
right level of investments and it is obvious that this depends on other factors as well, 
we could argue that in some countries, such as Italy, Spain, France, Germany 
(concerning E.On.) and UK, investments in the past have not always followed the 
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pattern of constantly increasing consumption. Based on our sample, it can be argued 
that, after the opening of competition in the generation segment and the unbundling 
of natural monopolies across Europe, transmission investments have decreased more 
in countries where effective separation has not been fully implemented, such as 
Germany and France 
 
Figure 2: Investment Path TSO compared to national electricity consumptions 
(2000- 2006) 
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. 
 
Furthermore, the implementation of unbundling ownership arrangements, as has 
occurred in Spain, has reinforced the pattern of continuous investment, compared to 
the position in other countries of Europe. In this sense, Figure 3 illustrates how 
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during recent years TSOs subject to ownership unbundling have invested higher 
percentages of their congestion revenue in network infrastructure than have vertically 
integrated TSOs.  
 
Figure 3: EU15 TSOs Ownership and Reinvested Congestion 
Revenue (2001-2005) 
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Source: own elaboration on the Impact assessment  (EC, 2007b) 
 
The European infrastructure has a number of weaknesses. Firstly, internal congestion 
and a weak interconnection infrastructure between Member States (Finon et al., 
2004) have led to the creation of different markets for electricity within Europe with 
persisting price differences (Neely and Goulding, 2005). Second, the enlargement of 
the EU is leading to ever greater complexity and instability in the network system. 
There is a need for more coordination. Third, utility privatisation has not created an 
environment that attracts investment in network infrastructure, and actions such as 
ownership unbundling and new mechanisms to provide incentives for merchant 
investments are needed. An orientation towards profit for the TSOs would create 
problems of loop investments. 
There are various policies that should be promoted in the transmission segment in 
order to benefit more from liberalisation and maintain a reliable system, in addition 
to ownership unbundling. First, it is essential to increase internal and cross border 
network transmission capacity also providing other direct incentives. Second, better 
regulation is needed to improve merchant investments in transmission and to provide 
incentives for locational signals. Third, there is a need to enhance the level of 
coordination management among TSOs as well as regulators. 
Differently than in past, today the European Commission seems to be aware of the 
key role of the transmission infrastructure in the achievement of EU energy policy. 
The creation of an efficient European market for energy requires improvements in 
the infrastructure. For instance, the so called SmartGrid programmes are aimed at 
developing technologies to enable an accessible, reliable, flexible and economic 
future electricity network for Europe (Coll-Mayor et al., 2007). A reliable grid will 
improve security and quality of supply. The new EC proposal for a new package of 
measures for the European electricity industry is focussing on unbundling, 
coordination among European TSOs and regulators, effective medium term 
investments plans and the establishment of the new European agency to take on 
specific tasks. If successful, this regulatory framework would solve some of the 
problems in the European transmission infrastructure. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of 
transmission investments and the achievements of the European regulatory 
framework. This is followed by an examination of ownership arrangements of TSOs 
across Europe and the investment patterns of a sample of operators. Having 
underlined the importance of economic investments for reliability within the 
electricity system, different policy actions are discussed as a solution to a “robust” 
transmission grid. These policies should help in avoiding risks such as blackouts or 
unfair competition as a result of asymmetries of information. The last section 
concludes. 
 
 
4. Promoting renewable energy sources for electricity: can the transmission grid 
guarantee it? 
Since the ‘90s, governments around the world have implemented renewable energy 
policies. These actions have evolved in different countries in a multitude of patterns. 
Also the European Union (EU) has recognized the importance of renewable energy, 
setting clear national targets for achieving increased production of electricity from 
renewable energy sources (RES). While there are important benefits deriving by the 
development of RES sources, currently only a small number of the European 
Member States are exploiting these opportunities. 
There are indeed various reasons for the European failure to achieve the established 
targets, and this chapter aims to analyse the development of renewable energy 
sources for electricity (RES-E) and the barriers to their deployment, with particular 
attention on infrastructure aspects. We also analyse the main source of renewable 
electricity production in the immediate future - wind power.  
 
Table 3: Connection Policies in the Main EU Member States 
 
Country Connection Policy Country Connection Policy 
Austria deep Belgium shallow 
Czech Republic deep Denmark shallow 
Estonia deep Finland shallow 
Poland deep France shallow 
Portugal deep Germany shallow 
Romania deep Greece shallow 
Slovenia deep Italy shallow 
Sweden deep Netherlands shallow 
Hungary partially deep Spain shallow 
Ireland partially deep United Kingdom very shallow 
Slovak Republic partially deep   
  Source: Scott and Kinini (2007) 
 
The increasing role of RES-E within Europe is raising new challenges for the 
electricity industry. Their deployment will play an important role in the future. 
However, there are a number of threats that are hindering their future expansion. For 
instant, Table 3 underlines the connection approaches adopted by some European 
countries. The different connection approach indicates which part of overall 
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connection costs is burden by new green actors3 and hence plays an important role in 
the penetration level of these technologies. Indeed, future development of green 
energy production will be significantly affected by the implementation of different 
cost allocation methods (Aeur et al., 2007). 
Elements such as the cost connection approach have not been properly considered by 
the European regulatory framework mainly because of the small penetration of RES-
E power plants in the past. However with the increasing share of electricity from 
green generators, a new European policy is needed. Transmission issues related to 
the deployment of RES-E technologies need to be considered carefully to reduce the 
delays that are occurring in achieving the EU targets for green power.  
Characteristics such as unreliability and intermittence of RES-E production create 
problems that must be taken account of when integrating new green power plans into 
the transmission grid. However, technological developments and the implementation 
of better forecasting methods as well as more interconnection between countries will 
reduce these risks and also long run system costs. The creation of a European Smart 
Grid will play a fundamental role in accommodating RES-E technologies and 
improving the reliability of the electricity system.  
Different barriers to the deployment of RES-E persist. Both the hardware and 
software are inadequate to support the changes in the industry structure. For instance, 
the policy maker has to play a stronger role than in the past to resolve issues such as 
the capacity of the transmission grid to support the entrance of new actors, a clearer 
cost sharing mechanism for overall system costs and provision of incentives for 
TSOs to guarantee more RES-E penetration. Specific problems need effective 
solutions. 
First, the costs, and who will bear them, of integration into the system of these 
technologies needs to be explicit. As will be discussed below, socialisation seems the 
best option to promote great penetration of RES production. However, the cost of 
RES integration within Member States is not always clear and requires good 
regulation to ensure that TSOs can transfer these costs to final consumers.  
Second, the EC Directive 2003/54/EC on the liberalisation of the electricity markets 
requires the industry to become more competitive. To achieve this, one of the main 
measures to be implemented is the unbundling of the different electricity segments. 
The separation of the competitive segments from the grid infrastructure has been 
seen as essential to reach non-discriminatory access to the grid for new market 
actors, including RES electricity producers. However, the less than successful results 
in achieving unbundling and the absence of a clear definition between the role of 
RES-E producers and TSOs in the overall cost allocation process, is hindering the 
further penetration of these technologies4.  
Although green players are often seen as new actors enhancing competition within 
                                                 
3 In the literature (and in practice) there are three main approaches to RES infrastructure cost 
integration. The first is super shallow integration in which the interconnecting costs of new green 
plans are borne by the end consumers through final electricity prices including the transmission tariff. 
The second approach is deep RES integration methods, which mean the new player has to bear most 
of the infrastructure costs. This method provides incentives for the RES-E producer to choose the 
optimum plant location in terms of the cost of network infrastructure. The third approach, which puts 
only some of the cost burden on the RES-E developer, is the shallow interconnection method. 
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the industry, there are several barriers to their entry. At the same time the big energy 
utilities are becoming more active within the green energy sector. While renewable 
energy policy has different beneficial effects and spillovers for other sectors, there 
are serious concerns over whether it will enhance competition and substantially 
increase the number of big players.  
Thirdly, if the objective of European energy policy is to boost RES technologies, 
then a cost interconnection approach needs to take into more consideration the 
particular features of different RES production. Overall system costs cannot be borne 
by other market players or by the TSO, and should be socialised. At the same time, 
there is a need for an efficient approach complemented by strong actions to the 
network infrastructure to maintain the robustness of the grid. Grid extension and 
reinforcement is essential to create a really competitive electricity market and to 
guarantee the entrance of new actors. Grid integration can be an important barrier for 
RES-E producers in distant locations. Moreover, if the RES producer has to pay for 
the interconnection, then a compromise must be found in relation to the distance 
from the infrastructure. However, the power plant location plays an essential role in 
performances of intermittent generators and sometime a compromise between 
location and overall connection costs is not acceptable, as in the case of wind power 
(IEA, 2005).  
 
Figure 4: Grid Extension Costs as a Function of Wind Penetration (Overall 
Results from Analysis of Specific Countries) 
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Source: Own elaboration on data GreenNet 2007 
 
It must be remembered that wind power will play a strategic role in the future. To 
sustain its development, further regulatory effort is needed. With higher penetration 
of these technologies, overall system costs will increase more than proportionally, 
and this could slow the progress of wind power projects. For instant, Figure 4 
provides an average assessment of grid extension costs as a function of wind 
penetration, demonstrating the over proportional cost increase. Moreover, with 
                                                                                                                                          
4 For instance, grid codes with technical requirements often present non-transparent rules, which 
sometime have been formulated by the vertically integrated power companies. 
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higher penetration, the intermittent nature of these sources needs to be complemented 
by solutions such as forced curtailment of wind power and increased interconnection, 
as in the Danish case. 
All these factors demonstrate that technologies such as wind power and small 
hydropower could be better promoted with a shallow (or even super shallow) 
approach. For instant, Table 4 indicates that the major producers of wind power in 
terms of generating capacity (GWh) are mainly countries where the shallow (or very 
shallow) approach has been implemented. For other kinds of renewable electricity 
productions a hybrid approach could be established, in a way to provide location 
signals for the decision of where to build the power plant.  
 
Table 4: EU Major States Wind Production (2005) 
 
Ranking Country Wind Penetration (GWh) Connection Approach 
1. Germany 27229 shallow 
2. Spain 21219 shallow 
3. Denmark 6614 shallow 
4. UK 2908 very shallow 
5. Italy 2344 shallow 
6. Netherlands 2067 shallow 
Source: Own elaboration on data Eurostat and Scott and Kinini (2007) 
 
Another problem is the cost of these technologies. However, it can be argued that 
electricity from renewable sources is not too expensive, but rather electricity from 
conventional plants is too cheap. Fossil fuel sources have always received and 
continue to receive subsidies and R&D financing, while their environmental costs are 
not internalized.  
In sum, there are several barriers to a greater presence of RES-E producers in 
Europe. In order to integrate the total capacity of intermittent RES-E within national 
and European electricity systems, new policy actions are needed. While the new 
proposal of the European Commission envisages ownership unbundling, which will 
have important effects for RES deployment, it does not contain any specific actions 
to improve the development of RES. Moreover, it is not known when and if this 
proposal will be implemented by Member States, leading to other delays for the 
achievement of EU green targets. In particular, the European policies toward the 
promotion of RES-E generators do not consider the indirect costs imposed on TSOs, 
which are an economic disincentive for their integration within the electricity system. 
It is essential to consider cost recovery for TSOs in the context of RES-E promoting 
policies. At the same time, regulation should take more account of possible 
anticompetitive behaviours that hinder the deployment of RES productions and try to 
generate efficient and effective rules to cope with this. It is clear, therefore, that there 
needs to be a rethinking about the definition of boundaries between RES-E policies 
and grid infrastructure as a precondition for further RES production development 
within Europe. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part analyses the RES-E development, 
the European regulatory framework and its achievements. We examine the 
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impediments to RES development and the grid transmission barriers. Having 
underlined the discretional power of TSOs (also leadings to anticompetitive risks) 
and the nature of new players in the renewable business – different impediments to 
further RES development within Europe as well as wind power deployment are 
discussed. The last section concludes.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Since the `90s, various countries around the world have undertaken electricity 
industry reforms. In order to restructure the sector, policy actions such as 
privatisation and liberalisation, have been implemented with different mixes and 
degrees of achievements. While the motivations of each country differed, they had in 
common a willingness to create a more efficient sector based on competition, 
fostered by a better functioning market with rationalisation of the industry and 
investments driven by market decisions. Policy maker have been led by the idea that 
all these actions would contribute to increased consumer welfare. 
These experiences across the world have brought important lessons about this 
complex industry, although the best design for the electricity industry is still an open 
debate, which is set to continue, perhaps without end. It appears that well designed 
policy frameworks do not necessarily lead to hoped results. Moreover, international 
experience has shown that they can lead to unexpected effects provoking the need for 
further policy actions (Sioshansi, 2006). 
The European electricity industry with its three packages of measures including 
several directives is a clear example of a dynamic regulatory process. In Europe, the 
mix of liberalisation, privatisation and government intervention needs to be 
considered with reference to the transmission infrastructure and will be key to 
achieving the three fundamental pillars of EU electricity policy. While there is a 
clear call for a specific policy for the transmission grid in order to meet EU goals, 
there is the more general problem of the need for a robust infrastructure. It is 
essential to have a minimum of network redundancy in order to allow the overall 
system to function properly in the different segments of the industry. However, the 
definition of an efficient network does not always match with the private goals of 
TSOs, especially those quoted on the exchange markets which hence are devoted to 
profits. 
This work has analysed several aspects of the current debated issues within the 
European electricity sector for a more competitive, secure and green industry, from a 
different angle to most of the existing literature, i.e. from the point of view of the 
transmission grid infrastructure. While it received insufficient attention in the past, 
this segment can now be seen as vital in the electricity industry reform debate. This 
analysis demonstrates that this segment plays a proactive role in the achievement of 
European electricity goals. Policy makers and market actors need to pay appropriate 
attention to the grid infrastructure. 
First, considering the competitive pillar of the EU energy policy, it can be argued 
that while the trend towards concentration within the generation segment is 
increasing (often without efficiency reasons), the Internal Market is far from 
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complete. A new European policy is needed in order to create incentives to invest, 
particularly in interconnection infrastructure to connect the different regional and 
national wholesale markets. The existing interconnection infrastructure does not 
guarantee the limitation of possible anticompetitive effects deriving from 
concentration in national markets. Investments in transmission will enhance 
competition, reducing the risk of market abuse and future collusion and hence are 
key to limiting most of the present and future threats to competition. At the same 
time, they are also essential to reduce internal congestion. A better implementation of 
the Internal Market would ensure an open and competitive industry with the best 
prices for final consumers. However, this is not envisaged in the near future. 
Second, as already discussed, in the past progressive electricity policy developments 
have not considered in a proficient manner the effects on the European transmission 
grid and hence the capacity of this segment to ensure reliability of the system. The 
analysis of different transmission system across Europe underlines that in past years 
investments have not followed a constant pattern, especially when compared to the 
growth in electricity demand. This problem  is supported by the existence of issues 
such as ineffective unbundling, lack of coordination among TSOs, recent blackouts, 
asymmetry of information, regulatory imperfections as well as persistent internal and 
cross border congestion. Moreover, this situation indicates that in the past utilities 
have been more conscious than regulators about the strategic importance of grid 
transmission investments. Actions such as ownership unbundling and new 
mechanisms to provide incentives for merchant investments are needed. However 
other grid transmission policies are needed to maintain a reliable system. First, it is 
essential to increase internal and cross border network transmission capacity. 
Second, better regulation is needed to improve merchant investments in transmission 
and to provide incentives for location signals. Third, there is a need to enhance the 
level of coordination management among TSOs and regulators. 
Third, we have to remember the role of the European grid infrastructure for the 
development of the third pillar of EU energy policy. There are a number of barriers 
hindering the further development of renewable energy sources within the electricity 
sector. These obstacles have not been considered in the past because of the small 
penetration of such technologies. However, with an increasing share of electricity 
coming from renewable power plants, a new European policy is needed. Within this 
context, the transmission issues related to the deployment of RES-E productions 
need to be carefully considered in order to avoid delays. Currently, it appears that 
neither the hardware nor the software of the transmission grid are adequate to support 
further renewable productions developments. The policy maker needs to play a 
stronger role than in the past to resolve issues such as the transmission capacity 
required to support the entrance of new actors, clearer cost sharing mechanisms for 
overall system costs as well as provision of cost recovery processes for TSOs in 
order to guarantee higher RES-E penetration. For instance, wind power will play a 
dominant role in the near future, but overall system costs will increase more than 
proportionally and this could slow the progress of wind power projects.  
Hence, all three pillars have important correlations with infrastructure development 
both at national and cross border levels. Investments in this segment play an 
important role, for instance an adequate infrastructure can help to overcome local 
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market power and the losses from internal and cross border congestion. They should 
help to enhance the security of supply and improve the deployment of RES-E.  
The creation of an efficient European market for energy requires improvements in 
the infrastructure. The new EC proposal seems to be aware of the key role of the 
transmission infrastructure in the achievement of EU energy policy. If successful, 
this regulatory framework would solve some of the issues affecting the European 
transmission infrastructure. 
In general, one can truly argue that regulatory activity and monitoring is hence 
essential in order to provide a sustainable industry in terms of future development. 
We need to take particular account of the special characteristics of this sector and 
each segment within the sector. In particular, we have to consider the problems of 
regulatory asymmetries in infrastructure specificity. 
Regulatory policies need to be reinforced to stimulate these changes. The present 
framework shows that liberalisation and integration in Europe represent a discovery 
process, with continuous interactions between market players and regulatory 
authorities. This third package can be only another step towards the definition of 
rules for this sector, while the Internal Market is still far from fruition. The 
development of the European electricity policy represents the classical example of a 
“reform of reforms” as indicated by Joskow (2006). The different changes in industry 
structure coupled with the effective implementation of European directives in future 
should lead to new dynamic interactions and challenges in the electricity sector. 
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